

# **Unconventional Human Intelligence Support: Transcendent and Asymmetric Warfare Implications of Remote Viewing**

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## **Abstract**

Concerned that a psychical (PSI) gap existed between U.S. and Soviet paranormal research efforts, the CIA sponsored discreet research into paranormal phenomena commencing in 1972. Over the succeeding twenty-three years, the U.S. military and intelligence services were actively involved in paranormal research and operations involving a process known as remote viewing. Remote viewing, which produced specialized human intelligence support, served as part of overall military and government organizations' intelligence collection efforts. In 1995, after assuming remote viewing program management responsibilities from the DIA, the CIA decided to terminate the program based on a controversial review conducted by the American Institutes for Research. Yet, remote viewing's demonstrated capacity for providing unique, non-technical intelligence support posits said program as a leading candidate for exploring currently evolving forms of warfare. Presented within is a brief history of the remote viewing program, an examination of its evolution over the course of more than twenty-three years, and a discussion of its continuing relevance to national security and emerging warfare trends.

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## Prologue

From 1972 until 1995, United States military and intelligence organizations conducted paranormal research and operations involving a process known as remote viewing. Remote viewing is generally recognized within the scientific community as the psychic ability to access and provide accurate information, regardless of distance, shielding or time, about people, places, objects or events inaccessible through any normally recognized means (McMoneagle 220). Official confirmation of government participation in such research occurred in 1995 when a small portion of the voluminous classified research material was made publicly available via the Freedom of Information Act.<sup>1</sup>

Paranormal research, involving parapsychological and psychical functioning (PSI), has been perceived a controversial field by American academia and scientific communities who have met its reported results with outright dismissal, skepticism, or methodological criticism. Since both the military and the intelligence agencies pursue efforts deemed acceptable risks, their involvement with remote viewing, therefore, sparks curiosity. What made the risk of potential ridicule by association acceptable? This paper reviews remote viewing's evolution, examines why and how the United States military and intelligence agencies became involved in its controversial application as a unique human intelligence (HUMINT) support method, and explores its, heretofore, unrecognized status as an important and possibly revolutionary form of warfare with asymmetrical implications.

## The Soviets, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Stanford Research Institute (SRI)

### *The PSI Gap*

During the late 1960s, the United States intelligence community became concerned about a perceived disparity between U. S. and Soviet exploration and exploitation of paranormal phenomena. Intelligence information revealed that the Soviets were funding research, at an estimated level equivalent to hundreds of millions of U.S. dollars, that involved at least nine and possibly up to fourteen major research centers (DIA). Much of the U.S. concern focused on *who* was involved with the Soviet research as opposed to *what* they were actually doing, particularly when U.S. officials discovered that the KGB and GRU were controlling the research (Swann Chapter 2: 5-6). Their anxiety was amplified by knowledge that Soviets did not routinely invest at these levels, both monetarily and organizationally, for non-productive programs devoted to pure research.

In 1969, while participating in a scientific conference at Big Sur, California, a leading Soviet scientist presented a research paper that, when subsequently analyzed by the U.S. intelligence community, indicated the Soviets were involved in some form of "distant influencing" with mind control implications (Swann Chapter 2: 6). The Soviet's organizational and funding commitment to paranormal, or psychic research, and the lack of any corresponding U.S. effort, created a perceived "PSI" gap. Further, this gap and its corresponding potential for Soviet breakthroughs were deemed to pose a national security threat that the United States could not

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<sup>1</sup> Archives for the remote viewing program material are in the possession of the CIA, which is currently in the process of declassifying portions of this material. The main source of information came from former program participants.

afford to dismiss out of hand, inasmuch as the research was being funded and directed by Soviet security services. Specifically, the U.S. intelligence community was concerned that the Soviets may have developed the ability to replicate psychic phenomena and to harness its potential. This threat, in an area of research that had historically been disregarded by American academia and scientific communities, prompted American intelligence services to begin accelerating efforts for a counterpart U.S. program (Swann interview; Swann Chapter 8).

### ***CIA Involvement***

Given prevailing attitudes toward psychic phenomena, the CIA did not know where to begin in measuring and/or quantifying psychical occurrences. Since most Western scientists generally regarded this whole area of endeavor as nonsense, the CIA thus began to look for a discrete research laboratory, operating outside of established academia, which could manage a quiet, classified research effort. At the time, the Stanford Research Institute (SRI), Menlo Park, California, was conducting annually funded government research, so it seemed a perfect match for the CIA's purpose (Puthoff 64). In 1972 several CIA officers approached Dr. Hal Puthoff, a SRI laser research physicist and former Naval intelligence officer who had worked for the National Security Agency. Owing to Puthoff's military and scientific credentials, the agents confided to him their concerns regarding Soviet research efforts in parapsychology that the CIA had been monitoring for over a decade (Puthoff interview).

The CIA's interest in SRI and Puthoff had been piqued by a report Puthoff had drafted earlier that year regarding his observations of Ingo Swann, a New York artist and reported psychic. Puthoff invited Swann to visit SRI after they had corresponded regarding experiments to investigate the boundary between the physics of the animate and inanimate. Prior to Swann's SRI visit, and without Swann's knowledge, Puthoff arranged for access to a shielded magnetometer used in quark detection experiments by Stanford University's Physics Department. Quark experimentation required that the magnetometer be as well shielded as technologically possible to preclude outside influences (Puthoff 65: Puthoff interview: Kress 3).

While visiting the laboratory as part of Swann's facilities tour, Puthoff challenged Swann (who had claimed that he could perform psychokinesis) to see if he could affect the magnetometer, as it could not be affected from the outside by normal means. Intrigued by the challenge, Swann "observed" the magnetometer in a manner that eventually became known as "remote viewing" and, with pencil and paper sketched the interior of its theretofore unpublished construction. According to Puthoff, the magnetometer went "berserk" during Swann's sketching. Essentially, the output signal for the magnetometer became visibly disturbed, demonstrating a disturbance in the internal magnetic field. Astonished, Puthoff asked what Swann had done; Swann replied that he had done nothing but "look" at it. When Puthoff asked Swann for a repeat performance, the magnetometer again reacted in the same manner. Later, Puthoff reported Swann's "remote viewing" demonstration had impressed him even more than the magnetometer's reaction. Apparently the CIA was impressed as well, for several weeks later, its representatives approached Puthoff (Puthoff 65: Puthoff interview: Kress 3).

### ***The Way Ahead***

The CIA officers asked Puthoff if he could arrange for them to test Swann via some simple experiments. The CIA's intent was to determine if paranormal phenomena were in fact replicable in a controlled environment. Further, if the experiments proved successful, would Puthoff be willing to manage a pilot program with CIA funding? After agreeing to consider this second

request, Puthoff, aided by Russell Targ a fellow physicist with a long-term interest and involvement with parapsychology, set about arranging the testing of Swann (Puthoff 65; Puthoff interview; Swann interview).

Conducted shortly thereafter, Swann's initial tests were rather basic in that he was tasked to describe objects hidden in a box. Swann performed successfully enough to warrant the CIA providing \$49, 909 for an eight month Biofield Measurements Study, which was in fact a cover for the study and research of remote viewing (Puthoff 65-66; Puthoff interview).

### ***Physicists Take Charge***

The Biofield Measurements Study initially began with SRI's remote viewers describing objects in envelopes and boxes, similar to the initial testing of Swann. These methods, however, evolved into what became known as "outbound remote viewing." In outbound remote viewing a "target person" would travel to a location (generally one in the San Francisco Bay area) which was unknown to the remote viewer who remained within the confines of a SRI laboratory along with a monitor. The outbound target person was sent to various, randomly selected sites under strict protocols designed to prevent biased or contaminated results. At a designated time the remote viewer would attempt to describe the target person's location. Normally these descriptions were both oral and in the form of drawings intended to depict features of the target site (Puthoff 66: Swann interview). Upon the experiment's completion, the remote viewer and all other participants traveled to the target site so that the remote viewer could see first-hand how close his or her mental images actually matched the target (Targ 79). The experiment was conducted on a double blind basis meaning the target site remained unknown to both the SRI experimenters and remote viewers alike. Using double blind protocol procedures to preclude artifactual results, SRI employed independent judges to evaluate the remote viewer's success and accuracy. Additionally, the CIA employed its own members as contract monitors to observe the ongoing SRI research to ensure strict protocols and procedures were followed so as to preclude any potential chicanery (Puthoff 66).

## **Remote Viewing Goes Operational**

### ***Coordinate Remote Viewing***

Ingo Swann was the driving force behind the development of coordinate remote viewing, or the ability to remote view using geographic coordinates, in lieu of an outbound target person at a designated location serving as a sort of "beacon." According to Puthoff, Swann felt his abilities were not being tested or utilized to their fullest potential, especially during the early stages of the remote viewing experiments. Consequently, Swann made suggestions that helped the program develop and mature. Eventually Swann also confided that he could remote view anywhere on the planet and beyond its limits, a statement Puthoff initially considered preposterous. In response, Swann suggested an experiment was needed to determine whether someone was required at the target site during a remote viewing experiment and recommended a remote viewing of planet Jupiter prior to the upcoming NASA Pioneer 10 flyby. During this experiment, Swann described a ring around Jupiter, and at first, thought he might have remotely viewed Saturn by mistake. Astronomers and others readily dismissed Swann's description until the subsequent NASA 10 flyby revealed that the ring, in fact, existed (Puthoff 68).

From this initial effort, the protocols were expanded and numerous experiments were conducted using geographic coordinates, latitude and longitude in degrees, minutes and seconds. *Scanate*,

short for scanning by coordinates, was the name given to this method of remote viewing. When provided with the geographic coordinates for any given location on the planet, the remote viewer was asked to describe the location in as much detail as possible. One of the major challenges facing the SRI team with this form of remote viewing was developing protocols to preclude the possibility of a remote viewer somehow memorizing all of the world's geographic coordinates (Puthoff 68).

Using Ingo Swann and Pat Price, another remote viewer, SRI conducted a long-range operational test of the *Scanate* procedures for the CIA during 1973. The purpose of the experiment was to determine remote viewing effectiveness under conditions that approximated an operational scenario. (Puthoff 68; Puthoff interview; Kress 4-5).

The experiment's results were profound, significantly impacting not only SRI's remote viewing program, but also the CIA support it received. The target site coordinates were for a West Virginia mountain home owned by a CIA employee; however, Swann and Price (located at SRI in Menlo Park), described a near-by facility that, in their opinion, was more interesting. The site proved to be a highly sensitive National Security Agency (NSA) facility, and both Swann and Price were accurate in their physical descriptions of the facility, as well as in their identification of its general purpose. Additionally, Price, "penetrated" a secured vault and thereby obtained the facility's code name along with those of various programs, one of which was extremely sensitive. He also accessed the names of individuals who worked at the facility, but this information proved to be inaccurate (Puthoff interview: Kress 5). Such was the result of the first-ever, long distance operational remote viewing test accomplished by SRI during the initial pilot program for the CIA.<sup>2</sup>

## **A Soviet Target**

During the following year, 1974, the CIA presented SRI with a long distance remote viewing experiment intended to test more fully the operational utility of this method of intelligence collection. The CIA requested that SRI, employing long distance *Scanate* procedures in a manner similar to the West Virginia site experiment, provide information about a Soviet site of ongoing operational significance. SRI employed Pat Price for the experiment. The CIA provided the map coordinates for an unidentified research facility in Semipalatinsk, USSR, a highly secret Soviet nuclear munitions site, where work was thought to involve development of particle beam weapons. Price accurately described the facility and the highly sensitive work that was being accomplished there. In particular, he sketched a giant crane-like structure that literally rolled over the tops of the buildings it straddled. [Price's drawings, along with an artist's drawing of the actual site based on a satellite photograph, comprise Figures A and B.] Additionally, Price described ongoing work inside one of the buildings that involved problems the Soviets were experiencing in welding together thick metal gores for the construction of a sixty-foot sphere (Puthoff 69-72; Targ 82-86). According to Targ "We didn't get any feedback on this for more than three years. We discovered how accurate Price's viewings were when this sphere-fabricating activity at Semipalatinsk was eventually described in *Aviation Week* magazine, May 2, 1977" (Targ 82). Unfortunately, by then Price had died.

Russell Targ observed Price during the above experiment. They were both in an electrically shielded room of SRI's Radio Physics building, located approximately ten thousand miles from

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<sup>2</sup> Over the next five years, SRI personnel involved in the remote viewing program were subsequently investigated by numerous governmental agencies for gaining access to such a sensitive government facility.

Semipalatinsk. Targ knew nothing of the Semipalatinsk site so as to guard against the potential for cueing or telepathy (Targ 82; Kress 7). Regarding this experiment, Targ stated "The accuracy of Price's drawing is the sort of thing that I, as a physicist, would never have believed, if I had not seen it for myself (Targ 82). While Price had significant success with this site, he also reported a good deal of information that proved to be inaccurate according to some of the CIA analysis (Kress 7-9). Significantly, this result was accomplished during the first-ever operational test of remote viewing for a Soviet site, and was not one of the best-ever results achieved throughout the duration of the program (Puthoff 69).

Price's performance during the Semipalatinsk experiment, with its mix of accurate and inaccurate results, was fairly representative of remote viewing in general. As subsequently discovered, some early remote viewing inaccuracies may have resulted from how protocols were employed. For example, during an early SRI outbound experiment, Price proved extremely accurate in describing a San Francisco Bay area site. Two water tanks that he had reported as being at the site were not there, however, and this observation was dismissed as inaccurate. Years later, SRI researchers discovered, via an old photograph of the same site, the two missing water tanks had stood in exactly the locations described by Price, but many years prior to the actual remote viewing. As a result, the SRI team realized it was therefore crucial to specify exactly *when in time* the remote viewing experiment was to be focused (Puthoff interview).

### ***CIA's Reaction***

As a result of the West Virginia and Semipalatinsk experiments, Dr. Kenneth A. Kress, a physicist and former CIA contract monitor for the SRI research, wrote a synopsis of the program efforts in an article entitled "Parapsychology in Intelligence: A Personal Review & Conclusions." At the time of its publication the article was classified "Top Secret" and disseminated within the intelligence community. Since then, it has been declassified and presents an even-handed remote viewing program evaluation. In his article, Kress addresses some of the CIA's and other agencies' attitudes toward SRI's research and results. He concludes that the research and experiments demonstrated paranormal abilities, but the researchers had not sufficiently explained them or achieved reproducibility. These conclusions were drawn from observations that the participating military and intelligence agencies were application oriented and thereby focused on immediate and relevant results, rather than the development and understanding of the underlying science and mechanical processes involved. Kress suggests to better determine how paranormal phenomena could be employed for intelligence collection and related purposes (Kress 14).

Additionally, Kress briefly addresses the national and political climate during the period when the CIA was providing remote viewing research support for SRI. He notes that the "Proxmire Effect"<sup>3</sup> was in full force during that time and any government contracts of questionable nature were routinely being held up to ridicule and scorn (Kress 1). The CIA, in particular, was under scrutiny because of its earlier involvement with controversial areas of research, especially research with LSD reportedly connected to a death. Because the CIA was concerned that SRI research might be perceived as some form of mind altering/influencing technique and therefore linked to the earlier tainted research with LSD, the agency subsequently

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<sup>3</sup> During the 1970s Senator Proxmire gained notoriety by exposing government programs he felt wasted taxpayer money. He routinely used the media to ridicule these programs in a contemptuous manner.

decided to "officially" terminate its support for SRI research in 1975 (Puthoff73; Smith interview).

Yet, the end of the CIA's support for SRI's remote viewing program did not sound the program's death knell. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) had become interested in the program, as had the U.S. Air Force; both were providing programmatic funding by the time of the CIA's "official" disengagement (Smith interview).

## **The Program Expands and Evolves**

### ***The INSCOM Program***

One result of Kress' article was its impact upon the U.S. Army intelligence community. Members of the 902 MI Group counter-intelligence division read the article and realized that if remote viewing was as effective as reported by Kress, then the 902 MI Group as well as U.S. research and development efforts, were vulnerable to its employment by potential enemies (McMoneagle interview; Smith interview).

About this same time, the 902 MI Group was being absorbed into the newly established U.S. Army Intelligence Support Command (INSCOM). INSCOM set about developing a separate program whose goal was determining the U.S. military's vulnerability to remote viewing. In July 1978 INSCOM initiated a three year remote viewing program, code named *Gondola Wish*, in which the first year would be devoted to training, the second to testing, and the third year to evaluation and reporting. Five months into the first year's training program, however, the Iran hostage Crisis developed, the training program was consequently terminated, and INSCOM's cadre of six remote viewers immediately went operational. Since *Gondola Wish* had been the code name for the initial training program, it was renamed *Grill Flame* concurrent with the program's new operational status (McMoneagle interview).

### ***The Iran Hostage Crisis***

With five months training under their respective belts, the *Grill Flame* remote viewers began receiving a massive influx of taskings and associated intelligence support requests from the National Security Council (NSC). One of the NSC's original obstacles encompassed identifying exactly who, among the over four hundred Americans known to be in Iran at that time, were in fact being held hostage. The *Grill Flame* remote viewers were successful in identifying all sixty-four American hostages. Further, they identified three Americans who, due to the sensitive nature of their assignments, were being held at a separate location from the main body of hostages. Had *Grill Flame* members not identified the three, thereby enabling our government to negotiate for their release along with the others (in addition to letting the Iranians know that we knew they were holding them hostage), they likely would have been tortured to death (McMoneagle interview).

Throughout the Iran Hostage Crisis *Grill Flame* members accomplished over six hundred remote viewings for the NSC. As a result of their successes, *Grill Flame* members began receiving weekly remote viewing taskings from the NSA, CIA, DIA, Secret Service, FBI and a host of federal agencies and organizations (McMoneagle interview).

## ***Expected Results vs. Actual Results***

During the Iran Hostage Crisis, one of the more interesting characteristics of remote viewing emerged and involves expected results, as compared to actual results that are sometimes achieved with this unique process. For example, it was imperative that the U.S. military determine suitable infiltration and exfiltration routes for conducting a hostage rescue operation. Consequently, a requisite tasking to identify such routes was given to the *Grill Flame* members. One of the resulting remote viewing products involved diagonal-like grid work with blue and orange diagonal squares, which covered an oval shaped object. Upon initial analysis, this *Grill Flame* product might have appeared to be a "miss" on the part of the remote viewer and dismissed as inaccurate (McMoneagle interview). Fortunately, someone followed up on what initially appeared to be a nonsensical result with no apparent connection to the remote viewing tasking. Located about a half mile from the U.S. embassy compound in Tehran, a market area covered by a canopy with blue and orange oblique squares, concealed an oblong shaped object that proved to be a manhole cover. U.S. personnel discovered that only Iran has these types of manhole covers (most countries use round ones to prevent people or objects from falling through). The manhole led to underground phone lines that, disappointingly, led perpendicular to the embassy. Archived area maps, however, revealed that a long forgotten sewer system dating back to pre-Persian or pre-Roman times, and unknown even to the Iranians, was physically located beneath the phone line system. The sewer system ran under the embassy compound, exiting into one of its garages, thereby providing the information requested for a potential rescue attempt (McMoneagle interview).

This phenomena, where seemingly unrelated remote viewing products actually have a direct connection with the original remote viewing tasking, may account for some of the heretofore determined "misses" or inaccuracies of past efforts. Moreover, it is reminiscent of the previously mentioned Pat Price episode in which he described two water towers that were missing at the time of his remote viewing, but had existed many years prior. Understanding these remote viewing peculiarities presented a challenge for both the viewers and tasking agencies involved. As the program evolved and corporate knowledge increased, these idiosyncrasies became better understood and utilized (McMoneagle interview).

## ***Program Evolution***

After the CIA had ended its official support for the program in 1975, but before INSCOM took over program management responsibilities, the United States Air Force served as program sponsor and worked with SRI in that capacity from 1976 until 1979. The DIA had become interested in the program in 1973 and was more deeply involved by 1976. As previously noted, INSCOM had its own program going by 1978, so parallel, independent efforts were being pursued by various agencies. In 1979 the Air Force disengaged from the program. DIA and INSCOM continued their respective programs until 1986 when INSCOM's program was absorbed by DIA. By 1988, SAIC had taken over SRI's functions, and in 1995 DIA was directed to turn the program back over to the CIA which then terminated the program that year (Smith interview).

A general expansion of the remote viewing knowledge base, procedures, and applications resulted as these numerous agencies pursued independent and concurrent efforts. This diffusion of effort, however, was accompanied by serious drawbacks regarding program management. While SRI remained focused on refining and developing scientific protocols of remote viewing,

INSCOM focused almost exclusively on real-world operational performance and results. This division of responsibilities between SRI and INSCOM would have been more effective had a common monitor or program supervisor administered both programs. As it was, no one officially served in this capacity; consequently, a gulf developed between the two agencies regarding scientific development and operational performance! For example, SRI would forward its updated research results to INSCOM, which would routinely ignore the information and fail to pass it along to its remote viewers. Concurrently, INSCOM had no systemic or programmatic feedback mechanism that enabled its remote viewers to discover whether they were successful or not for particular targets. INSCOM's remote viewers were consequently kept in the dark regarding protocol and methodology improvements developed by SRI, as well as their respective performances. Further, and as Kress notes, military and intelligence organizations assumed results-oriented perspectives that focused on near-term operational results at the expense of exploring and discovering the underlying dynamics of how remote viewing worked (Kress 14; McMoneagle interview).

### ***Tactical, Operational and Strategic Implications***

From 1981 to 1984, U.S. Army Major General Bert Stubblebine commanded INSCOM and personally supervised its remote viewing program. According to (now retired) MG Stubblebine, one of the main reasons his command became involved with remote viewing was its potential for accessing intelligence-related information considered inaccessible. Since INSCOM was in the business of intelligence collection and exploitation, he wanted to improve his command's overall abilities and saw remote viewing as a means toward that end. INSCOM, for example, routinely obtained target site imagery of buildings and other structures, but without HUMINT support, was often unable to determine what activities were taking place at or within these facilities. MG Stubblebine was willing to employ remote viewing in an effort to provide this information while simultaneously reducing the risk to HUMINT sources and potentially expanding his overall collection and exploitation capabilities (Stubblebine interview).

One of the earliest remote viewing tests that demonstrated the ability to produce the type of non-technical intelligence support envisioned by MG Stubblebine and others involved CWO2 Joseph McMoneagle, one of INSCOM's six remote viewers.<sup>4</sup> Given a picture of an aircraft hangar, McMoneagle was asked to describe its contents. In response he produced detailed drawings and three-dimensional modeling depicting the interior and exterior of a battlefield tank possessing laser optics and computerized targeting systems. The tank was the U.S. Army M1 main battlefield tank and the test was accomplished prior to the M1 being fielded by the Army, and while the program was still classified. McMoneagle's performance secured funding for the program for several more years, while demonstrating remote viewing's capability to provide unique, non-technical intelligence support (McMoneagle interview).

The information provided by McMoneagle would have been particularly valuable at the tactical and operational levels of warfare. The aircraft hangar could as easily have been a foreign nuclear or chemical/biological production facility, or even an advanced weapons production plant with strategic ramifications for the U.S. In a subsequent operational remote viewing for INSCOM, McMoneagle demonstrated unequivocally the strategic level intelligence support that remote viewing could provide.

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<sup>4</sup> McMoneagle's remote viewing of the M1 tank occurred prior to MG Stubblebine's Command of INSCOM but nonetheless demonstrated the remote viewing potential MG Stubblebine and others had envisioned.

Prompted by KH-9 satellite imagery during 1979, the NSC became interested in Soviet activities within a large Port of Severodvinsk facility. Initially, McMoneagle was provided only the coordinates of the facility's location, but during a subsequent remote viewing session was given the satellite photo itself. He reported that the Soviets were constructing a new class SSBN, which contained eighteen to twenty missile tubes and described the welding techniques employed in the submarine's construction. Further, he described the future construction of a canal that would be used to launch the new vessel and provided a time frame within which the launching would occur (Schnabel 70-72; McMoneagle interview).

Acting upon the information provided by McMoneagle, U.S. intelligence agencies coordinated overhead imagery assets during the period identified and were able to obtain imagery on the Typhoon class SSBN before it submerged at sea.<sup>5</sup> The information obtained about the Typhoon during this initial launching proved to be all that was available on the world's, largest SSBN for several years, and was regarded as an intelligence coup by the U.S. intelligence community (McMoneagle interview).

## **Determining Program Success**

### ***Unique HUMINT***

Remote viewers were not responding to routine operational taskings. Their taskings represented specific intelligence shortfalls or requirements that had not been satisfied via conventional intelligence collection methods and resources. In essence, remote viewing was the last resort, after established conventional methods of intelligence support had been exhausted or, by their very nature, were incapable of satisfying these intelligence requirements (McMoneagle and Smith interviews).

The context, therefore, in which remote viewing success was achieved fell beyond conventional measurement criteria. Numerous questions presented to the remote viewers were actually unanswered intelligence shortfalls that for years had remained in such status (within various intelligence agencies), as no other available means existed for answering them. Remote viewing, therefore, afforded an opportunity to find answers to previously "unanswerable" intelligence questions. When evaluated from this perspective, the program's success assumes a unique quality, as does the measurement criteria for its success. Tasking agencies and program evaluators generally failed to understand and appreciate this perspective. The overall thirty-five percent (approximate) accuracy of the remote viewers was considerably more impressive when evaluated in this vein; thirty-five percent (approximate) success was a definite advance over the status quo zero information.<sup>6</sup>

While program evaluation was both unique and difficult, the program's secrecy kept remote viewers uninformed regarding how their results were employed. For example, remote viewers would provide "source" material to a tasking agency that would then use it for its own purposes and assume credit for the success. Remote viewers were generally not aware when this had

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<sup>5</sup> The Typhoon class SSBN was not observed again for years by anyone in the West.

<sup>6</sup> Status quo zero information may have been preferable if remote viewers provided false or misleading information as part of the sixty-five percent inaccurate performance. This did not occur. The types of questions presented to the remote viewers were unique, given the inability of other collection methods to answer them, and accuracy or inaccuracy became readily apparent. For example, if a question involved construction of a Soviet aircraft carrier and the remote viewer described downtown New York City, the odds were very good that the information was invalid and inaccurate (McMoneagle interview).

occurred. Likewise, the tasking agencies never knew whom to credit for the information provided. Consequently, remote viewers had to continually train the various tasking agencies in how to best utilize their talents and products. Given these circumstances, the full value and significance of the program was likely never fully appreciated, if even recognized, by both the military and government agencies (McMoneagle interview).

Determining program cost effectiveness, therefore, became problematic inasmuch as the program's value was probably never fully realized owing to senior official's discomfort with program association, special access program compartmentalization and overall secrecy, as well as the lack of a single program manager. Nonetheless, when compared to mainstream technical methods of intelligence collection, remote viewing was inexpensive since the only costs involved were manpower and time.

Given remote viewing's nominal expense and demonstrated effectiveness for providing (novel if not extraordinary) HUMINT, was it cost effective and worth the effort when all was said and done? Did remote viewing provide sufficient value added to the overall intelligence collection effort to warrant even nominal expenditures? These are the types of questions one might assume inspired Congressionally Directed Action, which instructed the CIA to conduct a retrospective review of the twenty-four year remote viewing program. The CIA contracted the American Institutes for Research (AIR) to conduct the review covering the program's research and operations.

### ***The AIR Report***

In executing its contract with the CIA, AIR established a panel that included psychology Professor Ray Hyman from the University of Oregon and statistician Professor Jessica Utts from the University of California at Davis. Michael Mumford, Ph.D., and Andrew Rose, Ph.D., AIR employees, assessed methodological issues. AIR President, David Goslin, Ph.D., functioned as research coordinator. Science Applications International Corporation, which managed the remote viewing program from 1990 until 1995 was contracted to provide administrative support and technical documentation (May 89-90).

Essentially negative, the AIR report concluded that statistically significant effects had been demonstrated with remote viewing, but further replications were required. The report also asserted that none of the remote viewing efforts was ever used for guiding intelligence related operations (May 89-90).

Undoubtedly, a fair program review would have ensured that both hard-line proponents and antagonists of parapsychology or paranormal research were excluded from the review panel. Composition of the AIR panel, therefore, proved interesting in that Dr. Hyman was and remains an adamant skeptic of parapsychology, and Dr. Utts was initially considered a skeptic<sup>7</sup> (Gruber 89-91). Why would recognized skeptics be included in what should have been an unbiased program evaluation? Did the CIA preordain the negative AIR report through the very composition of the panel?

The most glaring shortfall of the AIR report was its superficiality. The panel limited its review to the last two years only of the program's existence, the period when the program was in participants who had been significant contributors during earlier periods of the program's

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<sup>7</sup> Dr. Utts was viewed as cautiously neutral by some remote viewers and eventually became regarded as a proponent of the program based on its results (McMoneagle & Smith interviews).

existence, 2) examine numerous comprehensive reviews all of which were positive except one, 3) apply consistent evaluative criteria for remote viewing, and 4) discount a discredited National Research Council (NRC) report whose investigators were kept from the vast majority of SRI's classified data, yet relied heavily on the NRC report when convenient (Gruber 89; May 90). Why would a review of a twenty-four year program be so limited in scope? Notwithstanding its severe limitations, the AIR review sufficiently convinced Utts, the statistician, that remote viewing was an anomalous cognitive phenomenon that could not be discounted, given the statistically significant results achieved during the two year period examined. She subsequently asserted that paranormal phenomena, when held to the same standards as any other area of science, had been sufficiently documented and established (Utts 23). This stance put her at direct odds with Hyman who insisted that additional research, documentation, and especially replication be conducted before ascribing the results to paranormal functioning (Hyman 31). The debate continues, but according to Utts, replication of remote viewing has already been sufficiently achieved (Utts 16). [See, for example, R. G. Jahn, "The persistent paradox of psychic phenomena: An engineering perspective," Proc. IEEE, vol 70, No. 2, pp. 136-170 (February 1982); R. G. Jahn and B. J. Dunne, *Margins of Reality: The Role/Consciousness in the Physical World* (Harper Brace Jovanovich, New York, 1988)].

The AIR report's assertion that remote viewing products were never used to guide any operations was absolutely false, as singularly illustrated by President Carter during a speech he gave to college students in Atlanta in September 1995. As quoted by Reuters, President Carter stated that during his administration a Soviet aircraft went down somewhere in Zaire and a meticulous sweep by U.S. assets had failed to locate any of the wreckage. Without President Carter's knowledge at the time, then Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), Admiral Turner, employed a female remote viewer in the search effort. According to President Carter, "...she gave some latitude and longitude figures. We focused our satellite cameras on that point and the plane was there" (Puthoff75; Graff 69).

Furthermore, the citations in CW02 McMoneagle's Legion of Merit Award belie the "official" position espoused in the AIR report (Puthoff interview; May 93):

"... He served most recently as a Special Project Intelligence Officer for SSPD, SSD and 902<sup>nd</sup> MI Group, as one of the original planners and movers of a unique intelligence project that is revolutionizing the intelligence community. While with SSPD, he used his talents and expertise in the execution of more than 200 missions, addressing over 150 essential elements of information (EEI). These EEI contained critical intelligence reported at the highest echelons of our military and government, including such national level agencies as the Joint Chiefs of Staff, DIA, NSA, CIA and the Secret Service, producing crucial and vital intelligence unavailable from any other source."

## **Why Was the Program Killed? What Lies Ahead?**

At every crossroad on the path that leads to the future, the warrior is forever opposed by a thousand men appointed to guard the past. – Paraphrased from an unknown author.

### ***Smokescreen or Political Correctness***

That the CIA intended to utilize the AIR report as a means of terminating the remote viewing program seems transparent. Dr. Ed May, former remote viewing program manager for Science Applications International Corporation, states "In addition to questioning the validity of

CIA/AIR's conclusions, I find such serious problems with their evaluation methodology that I have become reluctantly convinced that their conclusions were set before their investigation began" (May 90). One can legitimately ask, therefore, why the CIA, after ending "official" support in 1975 continued tasking the program for intelligence support until 1995, when it then orchestrated the program's demise? If the CIA considered the remote viewing program incapable of producing substantive results, why did it continue requesting remote viewing intelligence support for almost twenty-four years (McMoneagle interview)?

Did the CIA terminate the remote viewing program because it feared potential ridicule by association, or did it stage a "public execution" as a means of taking the program underground? Both are legitimate questions. The first is understandable given perception of paranormal activities by many within American society, as well as the CIA's past experiences involving controversial research efforts.

Arguably, the second question is more intriguing as it implies that the CIA recognized the value of remote viewing, yet intended to make it appear otherwise. By discrediting the program, was the CIA actually intending to continue using remote viewing but under its own supervision and for its own purposes under a newly established and more tightly controlled program? Or, was the CIA concerned that remote viewing could be used to access sensitive U.S. secrets by both U.S. and non-U.S. remote viewers, particularly if this ability was somehow to become publicly recognized and possibly regarded as intriguing or even stimulating by society at-large? What becomes of intelligence services if or when they can no longer guarantee the security of their respective nation's most sensitive secrets? Remote viewing could not be controlled and the CIA knew it. Albeit speculative, these questions are but a few that deserve more in-depth treatment than was afforded the remote viewing program by the AIR report.

### ***Remote Viewing and Asymmetric Warfare***

For the past several years, U.S. military and government agencies have been concerned with asymmetric warfare, which in this author's view constitutes an unconventional, innovative approach that targets an adversary's vulnerabilities across a range of modalities, with the intention of achieving disproportionate results. Such concern, and the manner in which it has been promulgated, has made asymmetric warfare appear as something new with which the U.S. must now contend; however, its concept is as old as Sun Tsu and warfare itself. Historically, adversaries have sought to disrupt opponents' centers of gravity via direct or indirect methods that exploit known or suspected vulnerabilities in order to achieve maximum results. What is arguably new, however, is the amorphous context within which asymmetrical warfare is now being considered.

The U.S. anticipates that future adversaries, indirectly challenging vulnerable areas beyond traditional battlefield confines, may strike via known or as yet unrecognized means; ergo, the increased U.S. concern. Moreover, the U.S. and its allies' reliance on complex information systems has magnified their collective vulnerability to asymmetric warfare since potential attack upon these systems could elicit disproportionate consequences when compared to the corresponding effort or risk required by an opponent. Furthermore, from an asymmetric perspective, a conflict's beginning and end may be imperceptible. In fact, the very definitions and conceptualizations of the terms "*peacetime*", "*conflict*", and "*war*" may already be obsolete. Remote viewing required the same deconstructing of established concepts, in concert

with abstract approaches to military problems, in order to evolve and succeed, making it an interesting asymmetric model for current applications.

An existing challenge is how to develop asymmetric responses or approaches to anticipated asymmetric threats within a symmetrical society and its established institutions. Clearly, a nation cannot expect its military and national security agencies to think and respond asymmetrically during hostilities if these institutions cannot demonstrate similar abilities during peacetime.

Remote viewers provided a glimpse of asymmetrically proficient warriors who are capable of, and comfortable with, abstract/agile thinking and performing. According to McMoneagle, a peculiar discovery resulting from operational experience was that certain targets enhanced remote viewer performances. For example, McMoneagle's accuracy ranged 80-90% when tasked with nuclear targets (McMoneagle interview). If a nuclear device were being smuggled into the United States, the ability to identify its exact, or even approximate, location could prove invaluable. Employing remote viewers to preclude or counter undesired events with nuclear characteristics represents an intriguing asymmetrical approach that could obviously be extended to additional attack modalities that leverage other remote viewer's aptitudes.

A current mantra regarding asymmetrical warfare is that future military opponents will exploit vulnerable seams to avoid attacking where the U.S. is strongest. The U.S. continues to lead and excel technologically, particularly in producing the world's most advanced weaponry.

Our technological superiority is our recognized *strength* and is precisely what our future adversaries will seek to avoid. Hence, what is the U.S. doing to prepare for the future conflicts beyond designing and producing more technologically advanced weaponry systems? What vulnerable seams are we identifying and preparing to defend, or are we continuing to build only upon our recognized strengths? Will the U.S. rely solely on technological solutions to asymmetrical problems? To prevail, our future enemies will likely be compelled to out-think and out-conceptualize us in imaginative and abstract ways.

### ***Transcendent Warfare***

The real challenge for the United States is not asymmetrical warfare, but rather what this writer calls *transcendent* warfare, the ability to conceptualize and subsequently actualize an entirely new form of warfare that transcends all previously known models. Said ability could enable a nation state or other entity to redefine and to advance warfare to a completely different level or dimension, possibly comprehensible by only a selected but powerful few. Granted, transcendent warfare reflects Zen-like qualities that elude definition thereby making the above challenge more difficult. *Non-linear/multi-dimensional* and *abstract/metaphysical* are tentative terms that convey this concept, however, ascribing to a pat definition may in fact signal inability to comprehend the concept altogether. Whereas asymmetrical warfare contemplates suspected, anticipated or potentially unforeseen threats/environments, transcendent warfare appears inconceivable or impossible as it moves beyond established reality parameters. Yet, herein lies its power and its threat. Is remote viewing a form of transcendent warfare? Quite possibly, since the observed performances and results garnered from the remote viewing program challenged existing reality parameters and established scientific principles.

Case in point: the discovery of a temporal/spatial effect (of cosmic dimension) that impacts human cognitive performance and serves as an intriguing yet transcendent-based result of the remote viewing program. Local Sidereal Time (LST) reflects the relationship between the center of our galaxy (Milky Way) and the earth's horizon in relation to an individual's location at any

point on the earth. When the galaxy's center is below the earth's horizon, human cognitive and anomalous performance, such as remote viewing, dramatically improves by an order of magnitude as compared to when the galaxy's center is above the earth's horizon (see Figure C). An analogy might be a moving telescopic lens in front of an eye. When the lens lines up perfectly with the eye, vision is extremely enhanced, but only as long as the alignment lasts. In some cases, remote viewer performance improved by over four hundred percent when LST was included in the protocols (McMoneagle 223).

Utilizing a transcendent approach, LST could be factored into the planning and execution of a military or government agency operation in order to maximize human potential, thereby enhancing mission success. The benefit of incorporating LST into operational planning and execution at the training level is overwhelmingly obvious and could provide a unique venue for better understanding human performance and heretofore unrecognized influences. Such an approach, however, would necessitate educating select military and/or government agency members in substantially expanding their existing perceptions of reality prior to training.

Transcendent warfare's impact extends well beyond remote viewing, which offers a glimpse of the possible. It also holds the potential for fundamentally shifting and expanding our current understanding of reality to such an extent that manipulation of established reality parameters, such as time, becomes possible if not plausible. The first nation or group that actualizes transcendent warfare will therefore possess a strategic advantage that may prove insurmountable.

## **Conclusions/Recommendations**

*"... There is nothing more difficult to take in hand, or more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain of success than to take the lead in the introduction of a new order of things because the innovator has for enemies all those who have done well under the old condition, and lukewarm defenders in those who may do well under the new."* (Machiavelli, *The Prince*—1513)

### **Conclusions**

Between 1972 and 1995, U.S. military and governmental organizations' remote viewing research and application demonstrated its effectiveness for accessing unique HUMINT unachievable via conventional intelligence collection methods. Spanning the spectrum of conflict, remote viewers provided crucial information from peacetime engagement to the tactical, operational and strategic levels of warfare. Yet, despite its successes, the program's 1995 termination likely resulted from internal mismanagement, CIA disinterest in assuming program management, lack of sufficient political and/or corporate sponsorship, and/or government organizations' inability to assimilate, or to be associated with, long-term unconventional or controversial programs.

The remote viewing program's termination represents a missed opportunity to more fully explore, let alone comprehend, a likely aspect of transcendent warfare. Arguably, governmental organizations' failure to more fully explore and develop the underlying nature of remote viewing, and human potential in particular, was the program's greatest shortfall as it was allowed to wither and die within conventional, symmetrically-oriented institutions. At some point if not already, U. S. inability to conceptualize transcendent warfare and to effectively develop/employ creative asymmetrical responses to dynamic environments will be recognized and exploited by our adversaries. Unless our institutions become sufficiently innovative and flexible in fostering transcendent and/or asymmetrical processes, there is little reason to

believe they can develop methods or programs for effectively dealing with future transcendent or asymmetrical threats.

## **Recommendations**

United States military and intelligence organizations' involvement with paranormal research, and remote viewing applications in particular, was initiated out of concern for the potential threat such capabilities posed to national security. According to Hal Puthoff, "The words 'threat assessment' were often used to describe the program's purpose during its development, especially during the early years" (Puthoff 73). Time is long overdue to discard fear of adversarial threats as the sole or primary motivation for pursuing these types of research efforts. Fear-inspired efforts are reactive, whereas transcendent and asymmetric warfare necessitate and exemplify proactive approaches that envision these efforts as opportunities, vice obstacles, for the exploration and advancement of human and/or institutional potential. Such a readjustment in thinking will require dynamic, visionary leadership to clear the way through the bureaucratic minefields presently in place for maintaining the status quo. That said, the following are recommended starting points:

- Establish a new, broad-based paranormal research program within a highly selective, military or intra-agency organization, employing the strictest screening procedures used by SRI, CIA, DIA and INSCOM in selecting/identifying remote viewing candidates and support personnel.
- Model the new program from the best features of the remote viewing program, but do not limit research to remote viewing alone.
- Explore a myriad of phenomena having potential military applications with the goal of developing transcendent and asymmetrical warfare approaches.
- Follow established scientific protocols in the manner refined by SRI while promoting open- minded, creative approaches to paranormal phenomena research and its direct application to military/interagency planning and operations.
- Explore and document LST effects when planning and executing military/interagency operations, incorporating lessons learned as appropriate.

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
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Typed transcriptions of the interviews with Stubblebine, Swann, Putoff and Smith are available from the author of the study. Transcriptions are not available for the McMoneagle interview.


**Figure A.** Pat Price's drawing of Semipalatinsk site and crane.

CIA Initiated Remote Viewing

**UNCLASSIFIED**



(a) SUBJECT EFFORT AT BUILDING LAYOUT



(b) SUBJECT EFFORT AT CRANE CONSTRUCTION

**FIGURE 2** MAP AND DETAIL OF SITE DRAWN BY SUBJECT



**Figure B.** Artist's rendition of Semipalatinsk site from satellite imagery.

H. E. Puthoff

~~SECRET~~





Fig. 3. Semipalatinsk, USSR target site.

## Figure C. Local Sidereal Time Effect<sup>8</sup>

As a result of scientific investigation into Remote Viewing [RV], a correlation was found between remote viewing accuracy and Local Sidereal time or LST. LST is defined as the right ascension value of the meridian arc that is directly overhead at each instant considering where one might be standing on the surface of the earth and where in the Earth is located in its orbit. If one were to conduct an experiment at 9 AM each day for a year in a single location, the fixed clock time would sweep our 24 hours in LST. When LST was compared to remote viewing results over 20 years, there appeared to be two effects: a 300% increase in effect size [RV functioning] correlating to 13 hours LST, and a hole at approximately 18 hours LST where no evidence of RV occurs at all.<sup>9</sup>




This has since been confirmed in later data sets. This hypothetically seems to indicate when the Milkyway Galaxy is hidden below the horizon RV is maximized, and when it is overhead the effect vanishes. Since at near infrared [ $1.28 \mu\text{m}$ ], the galaxy is not occluded by interstellar dust, a comparison was made of the Milkyway Galaxy center's location and the previously mentioned LSR RV data set. A near perfect statistical fit resulted indicating the Milkyway structure is probably embedded within the RV data.

<sup>8</sup> This material is proprietary to the Laboratories for Fundamental Research, Palo Alto, California 2001.

<sup>9</sup> Term AC on the Chart represents Anomalous Cognition [instead of Remote Viewing or RV].

## JSE and $1.25\mu\text{m Flux}^{-1}$ $40^\circ$ Beam $45^\circ$ Latitude



LFR

Taking further data from a web based RV experiment [14,000 trials across 5,400 participants—world wide], a 6 fold decrease at 12 hours LST and a 2 fold increase at 18 hours LST was observed which is the “reverse” of 20 years in laboratory experiments. This also mirrors all other large-scale experiments from the RCA radio experiments of the 1930’s to other attempts at using the World Wide Web. One must immediately ask why?

Because each participant in the web experiment filled out a descriptor list, this is a clean measure of what is technically called the sigma count [sum of fuzzy memberships], which can be called verbosity, or how much a person says, regardless of RV accuracy. In short people responded an average of two additional descriptors at 18 hours LST than at 12 hours LST. Another way of looking at this is that the galactic center may induce mental noise at 18 hours and at 12 hours there is less mental chatter.

Going further. Simulating various response strategies that mirror actual responses seen in the web experiment, one can adjust the equivalent verbosity and observe the behavior in accuracy outcome. Reducing verbosity of response we suddenly see a near linear relation between the amount of response and corresponding rise in accuracy. If there is a significant decrease in verbosity at 12 hours, then there is a decrease in accuracy and absence of RV—precisely what was observed in the web based experiment.

Remote Viewing aside, this implies that exposure to the Milkyway galactic center or lack thereof, produces profound cognitive effects [as a function of LST]. A preliminary examination of the different types of descriptors being used in the web-based experiment [i.e., low-level versus high-level] suggests that the galactic interference is occurring more at the lower levels. What is now actually needed is a \$1M, 2-yea rprogram of investigation to determine the range of interference in cognitive functioning, and the degree to which it may be affecting decision-making.